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Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In Carlisle v. American Automobile Insurance Co.1 the action
of an insurance agent having power to issue policies of fire in-
surance in advising the mortgagee under a loss payable clause
that the policy would be continued for his protection notwith-
standing a prior cancellation was held to constitute a complete
reinstatement of the policy. The theory followed was that the
coverage afforded by the policy was primarily in favor of the
insured and that, by continuing it, the protection of the insured
was necessarily reinstated.
The principal point at issue in Ferguson v. Belcher & Son2
was whether the defendant was responsible for damaging the
plaintiff's building in the course of demolition work. The find-
ings was for the defendant. The court also held that defendant's
liability insurer was not responsible for the payment of defend-
ant's attorneys' fees because the policy relied upon did not afford
coverage for the claim made by the plaintiff. It rejected, for
lack of proof, a claim for the reformation of the policy on the
basis of mutual error.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Paul M. Hebert*
Under the negotiable instruments law every negotiable in-
strument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration. Absence or failure of consideration is a matter
of defense as against any person not a holder in due course and
partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto, whether
the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise.1
These provisions have been interpreted to mean that when the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 La. 717, 86 So.2d 683 (1956).
2. 230 La. 422, 88 So.2d 806 (1956).
*Dean and Professor of Law, LSU Law School.
1. LA. R.S. 7:24, 28 (1950).
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plaintiff introduces a note in evidence he has the benefit of a
prima facie presumption of consideration and is not required in
the first instance to produce any further proof of consideration
even though the defendant has pleaded a want of consideration;
but, if the defendant introduces evidence which rebuts the prima
facie case, the ultimate burden of establishing the issue by prov-
ing consideration by a preponderance of the evidence is on the
plaintiff.2
In Redi-Spuds, Inc. v. Dickeys the defendant was sued on a
note given to the plaintiff representing the balance due on the
purchase price of certain equipment for the processing of potato
chips. The defense was a plea of lack and failure of considera-
tion based upon alleged misrepresentation of the product sold,
failure of the equipment to perform as represented, and failure
of plaintiff to deliver certain items of equipment. On the facts it
was held that the defendant had failed to bear the burden of
overcoming the plaintiff's prima facie case except as to a small
item representing minor equipment not delivered for which de-
fendant was entitled to credit. The case as a whole is typically
illustrative of a factual situation in which the burden does not
shift back to the plaintiff to establish the validity of the consid-
eration given for the note and is merely a reaffirmation of the
recognized principles of the negotiable instruments law above
referred to. A similar case at the same term was Bernard Broth-
ers v. Dugas.4 Here the plaintiffs sued on a $31,200.00 note and
defendant introduced evidence which strongly tended to show
that only $20,000.00 was paid over to the defendant at the time
of making the loan in suit. There was further evidence which
would have established, if believed, that there was no considera-
tion supporting $11,200.00 of the face of the note as the items on
which this part was based were never realized. Under these cir-
cumstances the court concluded that the burden of proof had
shifted to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that full value was paid. In view of the conflicting evidence it
2. Moss v. Robinson, 216 La. 295, 43 So.2d 613 (1949) ; Bernard Brothers v.
Dugas, 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956). In the latter case the court, through
Justice Hawthorne, summarized these principles: "The burden is thus on the de-
fendant of going forward with the evidence and rebutting the prima facie case in
favor of plaintiff. However, if during the trial of the case the defendant offers
evidence -which casts doubt upon the reality of the amount of the consideration,
the presumption that the note was given for value is rebutted, and the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to prove consideration by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 185, 85 So.2d at 258.
8. 230 La. 406, 88 So.2d 801 (1956).
4. 229 La. 181, 85 So.2d 257 (1956).
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was held that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof.
The holding was that not more than $20,000.00 of the face of the
note could be collected in the foreclosure proceedings under
executory process. The case is a typical application of the prin-
ciples of Sections 24 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
to the facts that were involved.
McClatchey v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.5 involved an action
by a depositor-drawer against the drawee bank and against the
individual payees to whom payment had been made by the
drawee. It was established that the plaintiff had given a check
for $2,071.00 drawn on the First National Bank of Lafayette
dated January 14, 1950, in payment of a gambling debt repre-
senting losses on horse race wagers. The defendant Walters
altered the check by striking out "First National Bank of Lafa-
yette" and writing in the name of defendant "Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co." and by changing 1950 to "1951." The alterations were
clearly established. Whether or not the alterations were author-
ized by the drawer-depositor (McClatchey) was the issue in dis-
pute with the evidence on this point in hopeless conflict. The
court made no mention of the applicability of Section 124 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law to the facts,6 but concluded that
recovery was precluded by Article 2984 of the Civil Code7 which
denies an action to the loser to reclaim what he has voluntarily
paid unless there has been on the part of the winner fraud, de-
ceit, or swindling. The court reasoned that, because the evidence
was in conflict as to whether the alteration was authorized, the
plaintiff (drawer-depositor) had failed to establish fraud by
clear and convincing proof to support the action for recovery of
a gambling loss. The dismissal of plaintiff's action was accord-
ingly affirmed.
It is to be noted that this was not an action on the instrument
itself, but was an action for the recovery of money paid by the
drawee bank to the payee receiving payment. The legal basis of
the court's disposition of the matter is open to question. If the
check was in fact altered without authority by inserting the
name of a different drawee it might be cogently argued that the
money so paid by a drawee other than the original drawee desig-
nated was not "voluntarily paid" within the meaning of Article
5. 228 La. 1103, 85 So.2d 6 (1956).
6. LA. R.S. 7:124, 125 (1950).
7. LA. CVIM CoDE art. 2984 (1870).
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2984 of the Civil Code. Again it would seem that a more substan-
tial legal basis for the non-liability of the drawee bank would be
the one-year peremption statute." Moreover, the case certainly
involved a situation for resolution of the problem of burden of
proof on the issue of consent to a material alteration.9 These
three substantial issues were not dealt with in the court's opin-
ion though it appears to this reviewer that their pertinence
merited careful treatment in the ultimate decision of the case.
Gladney v. Webre10 involved a mere application of well-settled
legal principles relating to the transfer of litigious rights result-
ing from the purchase of a note by an attorney. Following the
dismissal of an action on a note as of non-suit, but within the
time for appeal from such judgment, the plaintiff, an attorney,
purchased the note. It was held that the transfer of the note was
a transfer of a litigious right and a nullity under Article 2447 of
the Civil Code." The result was soundly based on the prior juris-
prudence on this subject.12
Under Article 2924 of the Civil Code interest in excess of
eight percent is usurious, but the limitation may be avoided as
a practical matter by capitalizing interest and principal in the
face of the note. In that event the interest even though usurious
may be recovered. 18 In Vosbein v. Leopold 4 the court again ap-
plied the settled interpretation of this Code provision. Effort
was made by the plaintiff to extend the doctrine of capitalization
to permit recovery on a note which had been given for usurious
interest and for $675.00 legal fees arising out of a different
transaction. No part of the face of the note represented princi-
pal. The court refused to apply the protection of Article 2924 to
8. LA. R.S. 6:53 (1950). See William M. Barret, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of
Shreveport, 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939).
9. The question of burden of proof in cases of material alteration under § 124
of the Negotiable Instruments Law gives ris6 to a considerable conflict in the cases.
Does the plaintiff have the burden of proving the instrument to be genuine or is
the burden on the defendant to prove the instrument has been materially altered
without consent? For an excellent discussion see BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 287
(1943). See Davis v. Jordan, 185 So. 545 (La. App. 1939) ; Interstate Trust &
Banking Co. v. Womack, 179 La. 732, 155 So. 6 (1934) ; People's Bank and Trust
Co. v. Thibodaux, 172 La. 306, 134 So. 100 (1931).
10. 230 La. 175, 88 So.2d 17 (1956).
11. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2447, 2653 (1870).
12. See State v. Nix, 135 La. 811, 66 So. 230 (1914).
13. It is well settled that the holder of a note may collect the face of the note
notwithstanding the fact that such note includes a greater discount than eight
percent per annum, provided the note does not have a greater rate of interest than
eight percent after maturity. General Securities Co. v. Jumonville, 37 So.2d 469
(La. App. 1948).
14. 230 La. 21, 87 So.2d 715 (1956).
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this situation. It was pointed out that to allow recovery by per-
mitting capitalization of usurious interest with transactions for-
eign to the principal obligation would make it easy completely to
circumvent the usury. The result is sound as a matter of inter-
pretation. It is pertinent to observe, however, that through the
process of renewing a note and capitalizing a portion of the prin-
cipal with the usurious interest, the usury prohibition is also put
at naught. That result, however, has the legislative sanction of
Article 2924 and the decision was correct in not extending the
doctrine further.
